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The right and proper ‘financial’ consequences to [mis]conduct is (and will continue to 
be) a subject on which we will encounter polarised opinion. 
The ‘huge’ fines being meted out by law enforcement agencies and regulators across the 
banking sector are ‘material’ (by most stakeholder’s reckoning). Prudential regulators 
are certainly alive to these costs. Take for instance, the impact of conduct cost expenses 
on UBS’s bottom line – the bank reported on Tuesday that the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority was forcing it to hold more capital because of “known or 
unknown litigation, compliance and other operational risk matters” (see the article by 
Jill Treanor in The Guardian entitled, “UBS forced to hold more capital amid currency 
probe” (29 October 2013). And this was, we understand, in spite of the bank increasing 
its headline Pillar I capital by reducing its risk weights assets over the recent past. But 
what of particular note is the Swiss authorities’ concern over the ‘unknown’ and well as 
the known risk factors. The capital adequacy consequences reflected a judgement-based, 
forward-looking evaluation of the bank’s risk profile. 
In any event, the capital consequences of legal risk can no longer be ignored. Hitherto, it 
may have been difficult to make the business case for a complete rethink of banks’ 
conduct risk management systems. Now, the effective management of legal risk is not 
simply a conduct matter, but has taken on prudential significance. Banks’ will now have 
to not only exhibit a ‘changed culture’ but also demonstrate robust operational risk 
management systems, designed specifically to identify, analyse, mitigate and feedback 
on conduct risks. This is where we see tangible value in the data being collated by the 
LSE Conduct Costs Project – data that must surely be at the fingertips of legal risk 
management personnel. 
Equally apposite is the debate on the unintended consequences of regulatory action for 
misconduct (i.e. the effect on stakeholders beyond the need to punish culpability and 
deter misconduct generally). Indeed, the culpability issues are just what appear to be 
preventing a settlement between JP Morgan and US authorities concerning mortgage 
securities. 
JP Morgan argue that when they acquired Washington Mutual (WaMu) in September 
2008, they did not assume responsibility for the bank’s past misconduct: in relation to 
mortgage securities or, perhaps, at all. As a result, JP Morgan argue, any fine levied 
against them in respect of WaMu misconduct should be indemnified by the US federal 
compensation scheme operator, FDIC, as WaMu’s receiver. Thus, (as Francesco 
Guerrera (the Wall Street Journal Financial Editor) reported on October 27, 2013), this 
leads to the somewhat perverse situation of “…forc[ing] one federal agency to fund part 
of a landmark settlement negotiated by another agency.” The outcome, at the time of 
writing is unclear. Nevertheless, the case raises questions concerning liability for legacy 
misconduct and the policies of enforcement being pursued by the authorities. 
Should the bank in fact suffer the financial consequences of so-called preacquisition or 
legacy misconduct? Should enforcement policy not require that, in the absence of a 
clear and unambiguous assumption of responsibly, there exists direct culpability in 
respect of the misconduct? 
 
I am reminded of the reports of the existence of a ‘comfort letter’, apparently issued by 
the US regulators at the time of the acquisitions by JP Morgan, providing an assurance 
that the authorities would not go after the bank. If true, the decision to pursue JP 
Morgan might be viewed with a degree of circumspection. A regulatory renege in this 
way certainly does not engender regulatory engagement and mutual trust and 
confidence. 
More broadly, as Mr Guerrera observed, “the stakes are high, even beyond the $13 
billion [being the proposed JPM/DoJ settlement sum]. Wall Street executives and some 
lawyers warn that if J.P. Morgan is found liable for the WaM…other banks will think 
twice before buying failed rivals.” Effectively – it is suggest by certain US lawyers – 
“…the government will ensure that no bank ever buys another rival in distress.” 
Are we therefore to conclude that, if the purpose of regulatory 
enforcement/prosecutorial action is to punish (remediate) and deter wrongdoing, there 
needs to be a direct link to that wrongdoing? This might explain the cynicism with 
which certain people have viewed the US authorities’ reliance on the favourable 
evidential and limitation provisions within the US “FIRREA” legislation to simply “get 
home” on prosecutions such as that pursued against JP Morgan. Having said that, if 
there exists wrongdoing, should the authorities not be at liberty to utilise whatever legal 
tools are available to them to bring individuals (and, vicariously, their employers) to 
book? 
In any event, if ultimately JP Morgan foots the bill for WaMu’s misconduct, does this 
then suggest that balance sheet culpability is just as sound a basis for financial liability? 
Of course, you might say that JP Morgan assumed responsibility for pre-acquisition 
misconduct implicitly in the purchase price discount it negotiated at the time: 
essentially, the consideration it paid reflected the allocation of risk between the parties. 
On the other hand, you might rightly argue that financial responsibility ought not be the 
basis of liability for misconduct, as opposed to other forms of corporate liability, 
unrelated to wrongdoing – certainly so, if you consider the intangible reputational cost 
to the bank arising out of this legacy misconduct. One can anticipate these arguments 
and each has some merit. But the ‘right and proper’ conclusion 
(enforcement/prosecutorial policy) is not so easily sketched out and the legal risk 
inherent in these issues is palpable. 
There are clearly many issues that arise out of the recent conduct costs phenomenon. 
Certainly, this short commentary proffers more questions than answers. But this is 
intentional: its purpose is to raise awareness of the issues and spark debate on the 
subject of conduct costs and the wider implications for not just regulated firms but for 
regulatory policy and approach. And I certainly believe that the LSE Conduct Costs 
project offers an excellent nonpartisan forum in which air these issues – alongside the 
risk management utility of the project data. I welcome views on the issues raised here 
and to an on-going and constructive dialogue. 
 
